Are the poor protected from budget cuts? theory and evidence for Argentina by Ravallion, Martin
L_OPS  -23  9/
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2391
Are the Poor Protected  Time-series data for Argentina
suggest that action to support
from Budget  Cuts?  propoor  social spending  is
warranted at times of fiscal
Theory and Evidence for Argentina  contraction.  Social  spending
in general-and  social
spending targeted to the
Martin Ravallion  poor in particular-took  a
heavy hit at times of fiscal
austerity.
The World Bank
Development Research  Group

















































































































dPOLICY  RESFARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2391
Summary  findings
Adjustment programs often emphasize protecting social  So fine targeting may be a mixed blessing for the poor,
spending-especially  propoor spending-from  cuts. Yet  bringing greater vulnerability to cuts, possibly when help
the incidence of fiscal contraction-and  hence the case  is most needed. There is a strong case for action to
for action to protect public spending on the poor  at a  protect propoor social spending at such times.
time of overall fiscal austerity-is  an empirical question,  An externally financed workfare scheme in Argentina
which Ravallion addresses using data from Argentina.  was far better targeted than other social spending but still
Aggregate budget cuts in Argentina in the 1980s and  had to ensure that a small but relatively well-protected
1990s typically brought proportionately  greater cuts in  share of the benefits went to the nonpoor.
social spending. "Nonsocial" spending was protected.  The program was clearly subject to the same political
But proportionate  cuts for types of social spending that  economy constraints that influenced the incidence of past
matter more to the poor were about the same as the cuts  fiscal contractions in Argentina. The program expanded
for those that tend to favor the nonpoor. Absolute cuts  into poor areas when the budget increased but retreated
were in fact greater for "social insurance" that matters  from poor  areas when the program was cut. It was the
more to the nonpoor.  program's disbursements to nonpoor  areas that were
But spending on targeted social assistance and  protected. Still, given the low wage rate offered, the
employment programs was more vulnerable to aggregate  direct benefits from the program were still likely to have
spending cuts than were more universal social services.  favored the poor, even after the cuts.
Social spending was clearly exposed to fiscal contraction,
but this was somewhat less true of propoor  spending on
things that also benefited the nonpoor.
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comments.1.  Introduction
It is now common for macroeconomic  adjustment  programs to call for a pro-poor shift
in the composition of public spending  - in combination  with an overall fiscal contraction, as
usually called for to assure macro stability. 2 Donors have been particularly keen to support
new public anti-poverty  programs and "social funds" that claim  to target extra assistance  to
the poor at times of crisis and adjustment.
The case for such action to protect pro-poor social spending rests on the answers  to a
number of questions:  Do cuts tend to fall more heavily on the social services  that matter most
to the poor? When cuts are borne by the poor, do they gain similarly from expansions? Do
add-on "crisis programs" help the poor? What happens when such programs are also cut? It
has been noted that existing theory and evidence  is woefully inadequate for addressing such
questions (see, for example, Agdnor, 1998).
One argument that has been made in the literature is that targeting spending to the
poor can undermine political support for the taxation  needed to finance that spending; the
poor might even end up worse off (Gelbach and Pritchett, 1997; De Donder and Hindriks,
1998).3  Broad political support for greater targeting may however be possible when there is
an exogenously  imposed spending cut, which brings tax savings to the non-poor (Ravallion,
1999a).  Even when the poor have no power over how cuts are implemented,  it is theoretically
possible that they will be protected from cuts without further intervention.  The outcome
depends on the preferences of those in power, notably  the extent to which they gain directly
from public spending on the poor, and (less obviously)  how quickly the marginal utility of
their spending on the poor declines relative to the marginal utility of spending on themselves.
Nor is it clear that the poor will be powerless  even when they are a minority. They may be
2  See  for example  the World  Bank's recent  adjustment  loan  to Argentina  (World  Bank,  1998).
3  Also see the discussions  in Besley  and Kanbur  (1993),  Sen  (1995)  and  van de Walle  (1998).
2able to form a small but influential special interest group,  represented by Non-Governmental
Organizations,  or they may be able to form a coalition  with non-poor sub-groups  who see it
as in their interests to not have the burden of cuts fall on the poor.
This paper first establishes  that the incidence of cuts is unclear on theoretical  grounds
even when the poor are a powerless  minority. So it is an empirical question. Good data are
now available for addressing the issue in Argentina,  which has undergone  a number of sharp
fiscal contractions  over the last two decades. The paper studies two main sources of data.
Firstly, section 3 uses aggregate  times series data on public spending allocations  to see how
the composition  of spending changes  with aggregate  contraction  and expansion.  Secondly,
the paper turns to a new data set (constructed  for the purpose of this paper) on one of the
programs explicitly introduced by the Government  of Argentina  (with support from the
World Bank) to deal with the effects of a macro crisis on the poor. Section 4 describes  the
program and how its performance  in reaching the poor is to be measured,  while section 5
tests how the program's performance  in reaching  poor areas was influenced  by spending cuts.
The paper's conclusions  are then summarized  in section 6.
2.  Are budget cuts passed onto the "powerless poor"?
In settings in which the majority of voters are not poor, one might well argue that the
poor will be obliged to bear a disproportionate  share of a budget cut on the grounds that they
are the least powerful. However, there are some obvious  problems with this reasoning. If the
poor have little or no power, and power is all that matters to the allocation of public spending,
then the same reasoning  would suggest that the poor gained little from public spending before
the cuts  - in which case they can have little to lose from cuts. It might be argued instead
that the non-poor care positively about spending on the poor (either through altruism, the
existence  of negative externalities  of poverty,  or other spillover effects, such as arising from
public good nature of some types of public spending). But then surely the non-poor will want
3to protect spending on the poor from cuts, and will do so without further intervention. Nor is
it clear that the relative power of different socioeconomic  groups can be treated as exogenous
to public decision making. Spending on things like basic education  and income support is
arguably one of the ways that the balance  of political power might shift in favor of the poor.
To explore  these issues more formally, let us suppose  that total public spending is to
be allocated between equal numbers of poor (who receive GP) and the non-poor ((G3f),  who
finance public spending out of their own income Y".  Both G'  and GP give direct utility to
the non-poor.  One can think of G( as social insurance (formal pensions and unemployment
compensation),  which benefits the non-poor directly and exclusively,  while GP  is spending
on basic social services (education  and health) which benefits the poor directly,  but also
yields an external gain to the non-poor.  Utility of the non-poor is U" (Y'  - G, G", GP)
where G = G' + GP. To keep the model simple, assume that the function U" is additively
separable in its three arguments. Let us also make the standard  assumption  that U" is strictly
increasing and concave in after-tax income, Yn - G .Assume also that (at given Y' - G ) the
function U" is strictly increasing and non-convex  in both G' and GP and strictly concave in
at least one of them, i.e., Up > 0, U,  <  O  and U'  > 0,  Un <  0  (using subscripts for
derivatives),  but that Up,  and U,,  are not both zero. Utility of the poor is UP (YP, GP),
which is increasing and strictly concave in both arguments  and also additive separable.
Concavity in GP assures that the poor do in fact prefer less variability in their allocation from
the public budget. The allocation of spending  maximizes:
U'(Y'  - G G', GP) +  AUP(YP,GP)(1
where A is an exogeneous  non-negative  number giving the relative power of the poor in
decision making over public spending. We can write the solutions in the generic forms:
4G'  = G'(Y',  A) and GP =GP(Y',A)  (2)
(Notice that separability of utility and exogeneity  of A  together imply that the solution is
independent of the income of the poor.) Aggregate spending is:
G  = G(Y-,  A)  (3)
Using this equation to eliminate yn from (2), we can write down the following equations for
how the spending allocation will vary with total spending  in equilibrium:
G'  = F'(G,  A) and  GP = FP(G, A)  (4)
The income of the non-poor is subject  to shocks. Spending  decisions can respond to
the state of nature, so maximizing (1) also maximizes  expected  utility (over a known
distribution of possible incomes for the non-poor).  However, government spending cannot be
saved and nor is (further) borrowing  possible in the low income states.
So an income decline for the non-poor requires fiscal adjustment  to maintain
macroeconomic  stability.  How will the change in spending be allocated between the poor and
non-poor? Let us start with the simplest  case in which the non-poor have full power over the
budget (A  = 0).  In a neighborhood  of the optimal  G" and GP, it is readily verified that the
derivatives of (4) w.r.t. G are given by:
nn
rG  > 0P  20  (5.1)
unn +upIp
+U'n
Up  "'-  0  (5.2)
pp
with at least one of these inequalities  being strict (further details are contained in an
Addendum available from the author). These equations tell us the incidence of the spending
cuts. It is clear that spending on the poor need not bear the burden of cuts, even though the
non-poor have full power over the spending allocation.  Indeed, it is evident from (5.2) that if
U'  is linear in G" (i.e., Unn,  = 0 ) then the poor will bear none of the spending cut required to
5restore equilibrium after an income decline for the non-poor.  Nor will they gain anything
from "trickle down", here interpretable  as higher  public spending stemming from higher
incomes of the non-poor. Even a very small degree of interdependence  could be sufficient for
this outcome.  The above model is sufficiently  general to allow an arbitrarily small positive
share of spending going to the poor. By contrast, if U" is linear in GPthen the poor will bear
the full amount of the retrenchment,  and all of an increment  to spending will go to the poor.
More generally,  the poor will bear absolutely more of the cut in total spending
(GP - G' increasing in G) if and only if U'  is greater than U,7,..
Whether  the poor tend to gain more from expansions  than they lose from cuts depends
on the curvature of the relationship  between spending  incidence and total spending. Since  the
slope of that relationship  depends on second derivatives  of utility,  the curvature will depend
on third derivatives. The possibility  of an asymmetry  in the effects of cuts versus expansions
is then even more difficult to predict in this model.
These uncertainties  about the incidence of spending changes are found in more
general models. Suppose  now that A is a positive constant. Equation (5.2) is now:
TP  p  =  U"n  (6)
U'  +U'  +AUP nn  pp  pp
Assuming  that Un,  Upp and UP  are all independent  of 2,  it is evident from (6) that the
right hand side is strictly decreasing in  A .The lower the power of the poor, the greater the
extent to which the changes in total spending affect the amount going to the poor. However, a
more  general result (in which  U',  Un  and  Up'p  are free to vary) is illusive, since it will
depend on third derivatives  of the utility function.
Relaxing the assumption  that A is constant, let us assume instead  that A =  -(GP),
which is strictly increasing and concave in GP. Greater spending on the poor raises their
6power over how public spending is allocated, such as by providing resources needed to lobby
govemments for more pro-poor spending. Equation (5.2) becomes:
FGP =  Mn  (7)
Un +Up  +AUp  +lpyUP+22pU(
Even assuming again that U'  , Un,  and UP  are unaffected  (as would be the case with
quadratic  utility functions),  the sign of (7) is ambiguous. 4 Assuming that A(GP) UP  (YP, GP)
is concave in GPand that Unn,  Up  and UP  are unaffected  by the change in the distribution
of power, the right hand side of (7) is lower than (5.2); the poor will be more protected than if
the non-poor  have all the power (2 =0). Intuitively,  what the "power effect" does in this case
is make the marginal (weighed  aggregate)  utility of spending on the poor increase more
sharply as spending on the poor falls, attenuating  the impact of spending changes on the poor.
However, this need not hold if ApUp is sufficiently  large. When spending on the poor has a
large impact on their political power (a high  P  ), a budget cut will undermine  their relative
power, further magnifying the impact of the cut. A low marginal  utility of spending for the
poor will help counteract this effect; and a high marginal  utility will magnify it further.
One can extend this model in a number  of ways. One might expect A to vary with
incomes of both the poor and non-poor. The initial income loss of income for the non-poor
(that led to retrenchment)  will presumably  raise the relative power of the poor, helping to
mitigate the effect on their power. Of course, if the income loss is shared by the poor then
this will weaken  their power; the final outcome will depend on how the distribution of
income changes, and how this affects the relative power of the poor in decision making.
4  This  arises  from  the  well known  fact  that  the product  of two positive,  increasing,  and concave
functions  need  not be concave;  indeed,  A(Gp) UP  (YP, GP) could  be convex  in GP  even  though
A(GP) and UP(YP,GP)  are  both concave  in GU'.
7These arguments  have clearly  not exhausted  the theoretical  possibilities. For example,
I have said nothing about the possibility of the poor forming  a coalition with a subset of the
non-poor so as to protect the poor from cuts.
However, the above discussion  provides adequate  warning against presuming  that the
poor will necessarily bear the brunt of cuts in situations in which the non-poor hold the
balance of power over the budget. The need for specific  actions to protect the poor must then
be deemed an empirical question.
The rest of this paper addresses that question  using data for Argentina. Evidence will
be drawn from very different sources. In the next section, time series evidence on aggregate
budget allocations across  types of spending will be studied. After that, the paper turns to
evidence  for just one anti-poverty  program. Although the data will be very different, in both
the aim will be to examine how the composition  of spending  varies with total spending i.e., to
estimate empirical models motivated  by equation (4).
3.  Social spending in Argentina during fiscal expansions and contractions
While methods of measurement  differ, it is widely agreed  that in the mid-1990s less
than 30% of the population is poor by Argentinean  standards  (World Bank, 1999). The level
of "social spending" averaged 56% of total government  spending in the period 1980-97
(Government  of Argentina, 1999). Less than half of this went to "social services" (education,
health, water and sewerage,  housing and urban development,  social assistance,  and labor
programs);  the remainder  can be labeled "social insurance"  (pensions, public health
insurance,  unemployment  insurance). Spending  on social services is believed  to be pro-poor,
in that the poorest x% of households  receive more than x% of spending, but this is not so for
social insurance (Gasparini, 1999; Llach and Montoya, 1999). Table 1 reproduces recent
estimates of the incidence of public spending  on social insurance  as distinct from the social
services.  The results confirm  that social service spending is more pro poor than social
8insurance.  Access to social insurance in Argentina  typically requires that one has a job in the
formal segment  of the labor market, which is less than half of the workforce, and relatively
few of the poor (World Bank, 1999).
There is evidence  that spending on social services  has responded more to changes in
national income than has social insurance.  Wodon and Hicks (1999) study the effects of
changes in GDP on targeted spending on social services  (about  4% of total government
spending).  They find that the ratio of targeted  public spending to the number of poor had a
positive elasticity (of about three) to GDP; in recessions,  there were more poor people, and
less was spent on them.
The political regime is also likely to matter.  For a sample of Latin American countries
(including Argentina),  Brown and Hunter (1999) find that democracies are more likely to
protect social spending in a recession,  but that authoritarian  regimes are more inclined  to
expand social spending when the crisis is over.5 Argentina  has been a democracy  since 1982.
The data series I will use start in 1980,  and so it is reasonable to ignore the change in regime.
In this setting I examine how changes  in the government's total budget affected the
level and composition  of social spending. Did budget cuts have similar effects to budget
expansions? Were the categories of spending  that are known to matter to the poor more
protected  than other types of spending?
Figure 1 offers a direct test for whether social spending has been protected  from
budget cuts. The figure plots the time series of changes in the log of total public spending
("Gasto Puiblico  Consolidado")  and the log of social spending (both in 1997  prices) as
compiled  by Government  of Argentina (1999) and covering the period 1980-97.6 Unlike
5  This  study  does not,  however,  control  for  the level  of total  spending,  so it is unclear  whether
the identified  effects  operate  through  the composition  of spending  or its aggregate  level;  "non-social
spending  may well behave the same way as social spending.
6  Both  time series  are highly  serially  correlated;  indeed,  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests do not
reject the unit root hypothesis for either variable at even the 10% levels. So the following analysis will
focus on changes from year to year rather than levels.
9most other compilations of public spending data, this one includes all levels of govermnent.
In this and other respects, considerable  care appears  to have gone into constructing  the data.
There is clearly little sign that social spending was protected from cuts. Indeed,  there
is sizable co-movement,  with indications  that (if anything) social spending was more volatile
than other types of spending. One can see quite large proportionate  declines in social
spending in every year in which total spending falls. On the other hand, one often sees
smaller (and sometimes  negative) changes  in social spending when total spending rises.
Letting Gs denote social spending at date t, and Gt total spending, one can test whether  the
elasticity to an increase in total spending differs from that for a decrease using the regression:
AlnGs  = a + [yl,5,  + Y2(1-  3,)]A ln  G, +  et  (8)
where a is a time trend, yr is the elasticity when total spending increases, y2 is the elasticity
when it falls, and et _ I(AInG  G)  takes the value unity when AlnG,  > 0 and zero otherwise.
The data in Figure 1 yield an estimate of 0.14 for y1.This is not significantly
different from zero (the standard  error is 0.37). On the other hand, the estimated elasticity to
a decrease in total spending  (r2)  is 2.14, which is significantly  greater than one (the standard
error is 0.26). Social spending responds  elastically  to aggregate  cuts, but the responsive to
fiscal expansions is not statistically  significant. 7 The constant  term of 0.086, which is
significant (t-ratio=2.83),  indicating  a sizable independent  trend increase in the share of social
spending. By contrast, non-social spending  was well protected;  the elasticity when total
spending fell was 0.09, and not significantly  different from zero (a standard error of 0.22); on
the other hand, the elasticity to an increase was 1.68 (standard  error of 0.41).
7  The average  elasticity  (constraining  y, and Y2  to be equal)  is 1.366,  with  a standard  error  of
0.21; however, the restriction that ri =Y2  performs  poorly (t=3.16).
10While these elasticities are of descriptive  interest, their causal interpretation  requires
that we believe that changes in total spending are uncorrelated  with the error term e*  in (8).
To test for the causal effect on social spending,  I assume that the elasticity to higher spending
is in fact zero (on the grounds  that the OLS results are so strong that it is difficult to believe
they are not robust in this respect). Under this assumption,  I use lagged values of both social
spending and other spending as instruments for cuts in total spending. The resulting 2SLS
estimate for the elasticity of social spending to a cut in the total budget is 2.28 with a standard
error of 0.27. Again, not only is social spending  not protected, its elasticity to cuts exceeds
one, implying a fall in the share of social spending during fiscal contractions.
This protection of "non-social"  spending does not however mean that the non-poor
shift the cuts to the "powerless poor". As was noted in section 3.1, social spending in
Argentina includes types of spending  that matter more to the non-poor than the poor, such as
social insurance. Also, there may be pro-poor changes  in the composition of social spending,
dampening the marginal impact on the poor.8
To see how the composition  of social spending changes with cuts, Table 2 reports
estimates of equation (8) for various categories  of social spending. The same pattern is
evident in almost all spending components;  social spending  responds elastically  to cuts in the
total budget, but does not respond significantly  to budget increases. The only exception  is
housing and urban spending, which is not significantly  different for an increase in total
spending versus a decrease, and is not significantly  different from zero.
The elasticity to budget cuts is very similar for social services as social insurance. 9
The table also gives the 2SLS estimate of the elasticity to budget cuts. The most notable
8  There  is evidence  (for  India)  that spending  composition  is not homogeneous  in the level  of
spending  (Lanjouw  and  Ravallion,  1999).
9  The  difference  between  social  insurance  and social  services  in the elasticities  is not significant
(t-0.3  0);  nor can  one reject  the null  that  the parameters  are  jointly  the same  (F=0.28).
11difference  is that spending on employment  programs becomes highly elastic to cuts; these
include the Trabajar Programs we will study in depth in the next section.
This unifonnity in the elasticities  to budget cuts between social insurance and social
services is inconsistent with the idea that cuts will simply  be passed onto the categories of
spending that matter most to the poor. As we have seen from Table 1, middle (and upper)
income groups are likely to benefit relatively more from pensions and (formal sector)
unemployment compensation  than the poorest quintile. The non-poor might also be expected
to resist cuts to these categories of spending given that formal social insurance spending is
heavily pre-committed,  and hence harder to cut. Yet we find that the proportionate cuts are
just as great for social insurance as social services; the absolute cuts are in fact higher for
social insurance, given that it accounts for a higher share of the budget.
A possible explanation for this result is that the benefits to the non-poor from social
services are tied to consumption  by the poor. It is hard to cut spending on schools without
also hurting the non-poor. Inability to finely target many social services thus helps protect
the poor from differentially higher cuts, even though the non-poor benefit proportionately
less from this type of spending than from social insurance.
This begs the question: did more targeted categories  of social services receive heavier
cuts? Government of Argentina (1999) provides a classification of social service spending
according to whether it is "targeted" or "universal". The targeted programs are housing and
urban programs, social assistance and employment  programs; on average, these account for
17.7% of spending on social services. Table 2 also gives the estimnates  of yl and 72  classified
this way. The elasticity to total spending cuts is not any higher for the targeted components of
social services; indeed, if anything, the elasticity is higher for universal social services.
However, this conclusion is sensitive to the classification of "targeted" spending.
Table 2 also gives separate estimates for two of the components  of targeted social service
12spending, namely social assistance and employment. Both have high elasticities to a fall in
total spending. If one excludes housing and urban from the targeted component we also find a
relatively high elasticity (Table 2).  So these results do offer some support for the conclusion
that targeted social spending is more vulnerable to fiscal contraction.
4.  Tracking  expansion  and contraction in an anti-poverty  program
The above results do not suggest that social spending provided a good safety net for
Argentina's poor at times of fiscal adjustment,  given how exposed that spending was to
aggregate cuts, and how little of it went to the poor at normal times. This provides a strong
motivation for looking to alternative  programs that might better reach the poor in a crisis. We
shall now study one such program in depth. The program was picked because of the
unusually rich data available, and the fact that these data cover a period in which the program
both expanded and contracted. We will examine how well the program performed in
reaching the poor in a crisis, and see how its performance  changed with both aggregate
expansion and contraction, exploiting the fact that this happened differently in different
provinces.
4.1  The Trabajar Programs
The Government of Argentina introduced the Trabajar  Program in 1996, in the wake
of a sharp rise in unemployment,  and evidence  that this was hurting the poor more than
others. In May 1997 the unemployment rate for the poorest decile of households (ranked by
household income per capita) in Greater Buenos Aires was 40% versus 17% on average. The
Trabajar Programs also followed a period of declining social spending (Figure 1).
The program's aim was to reduce poverty by providing relatively low wage work on
community  projects in poor areas. The central government pays for the wage cost, and local
or provincial governments cover the non-wage costs. Within provincial budget allocations,
proposals for sub-projects  compete for central funding according to a points system. Three
13versions of the program have been tried since then, Trabajar  I, II and III. In terms of design,
Trabajar II (TII) and III are more similar to each other than either are to Trabajar I (TI). There
were substantial design changes between Trabajar  I and II. The inter-provincial allocation of
spending was reformed, moving away from a largely political process to an explicit formula
based on the estimated number of poor unemployed workers in each province. TII also put
greater emphasis on creating assets of value to poor communities. Poverty measures were
included in the center's budget allocation rules and in the selection criteria for sub-projects.
The poverty focus was also made clearer to provincial administrators.  TIII was very similar
to its predecessor in design. The main difference was that greater emphasis was placed on the
quality of sub-projects,  to assure that the assets created were of value to the communities.
The World Bank has supported TIl and TIII by loans (disbursed against the wage payments),
and through technical support on program design, monitoring and evaluation. All results
quoted for Tlll in this paper relate to the first 16 months of its operation, up to November
1999. (TIII is ongoing at the time of writing, and is scheduled to finish in mid 2000.)
From the point of view of this paper, an important difference between the three
versions of the program is in the level of funding. In Trabajar  I, disbursements by the center
(covering wages for participating workers) averaged $77 million per annum; for TIl this rose
to $160 million per annum, and it then fell to $98 million per annum under TIII. As we will
see, there were also differences in levels of funding between sub-periods.
Survey-based impact evaluation methods  have been used to assess the gains to
participating workers and their families from TIl and TIII. Propensity-score  matching
methods were used to construct a comparison group to surveyed Trabajar participants from
an identical national sample survey implemented  at the same time. Income gains were then
estimated by comparing incomes of the Trabajar participants with the matched comparison
group. The results have indicated that Trabajar  jobs are well targeted to the poor; Figure 2
14gives the concentration curve for worker participation  in the program. This was estimated by
locating the families of a random sample of 3,500 Trabajar workers within the national
distribution (based on a sample of 22,000 families).'  0For example, 76% of people living in
the households of participating workers had a household income per capita that placed them
amongst the poorest 20% of Argentineans nationally.
How does this incidence of income gains compare to other social spending in
Argentina? Table 3 gives the concentration curves for the Trabajar program and both
aggregate social service spending and social insurance, all on a household basis (to assure
that the Trabajar concentration curve is comparable with the numbers in Table 1). Since
there is very little variation in the Trabajar wage rate, the concentration curve based on
participation is also the benefit incidence curve for gross wage payments."  It can be seen
from Table 3 that the direct income gains from the program were far better targeted than
social insurance and social services as a whole. The program's targeting also appears to be
better than any other targeted programs in Argentina. Amongst the programs for which
incidence calculations are given in World Bank (1999, Table 3.7), the next best performance
was for programs directed at pregnant mothers and children, for which 70% of the benefits
went to the poorest quintile of households, which was itself an unusually good performance
compared to other programs.
Of course, targeting performance is only one factor in assessing the performance of
such programs in reducing poverty (Ravallion, 1999b). A program such as Trabajar is
designed to help in one dimension of poverty, while programs directed at health and nutrition
of the poor help in quite different dimensions;  both types of programs can have important
10  Identical  surveys  were  used  for the program  participants  and the national  sample,  and the
surveys  were implemented  at approximately  the same  time;  for details  see Jalan  and Ravallion  (1999).
"1  Again  this does  not net  out foregone  income,  though  nor do the standard  benefit  incidence
calculations  in Table I take account  of behavioral  responses.  However,  as noted  above,  factoring  in
foregone  income  mainly  affects  the concentration  curve  below  the 20kh  percentile  (Jalan  and
Ravallion,  1999).
15roles. Nor does targeting performance tell us anything about net income gains. Using
propensity score matching methods, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) estimate the net income gains
from the Trabajar program, allowing for foregone income. The net income gains to
participating workers represented 50% of the gross wage gains on average (Jalan and
Ravallion, 1999). (Factoring in foregone income mainly affects the concentration curve
below the 20th percentile.)
Such calculations relate solely to the benefits from the work provided by the scheme.
There are also indirect benefits from the assets created. While non-poor people are unlikely
to find the Trabajar wage attractive, they would no doubt like to have the scheme producing
things of value in their communities. (There is negligible cost recovery.) How well did the
program perform in assuring that the work was provided in poor areas? How did this change
when the program expanded and contracted?
One can monitor the extent to which the program reached poor areas, by tracking the
geographic distribution of disbursements  and comparing this to the poverty map of
Argentina. By doing so within a period of budget expansion then contraction, and comparing
the results across provinces, we will be able to test for budget effects on this aspect of the
programs' poor-area targeting performance. The following section outlines the method.
4.2  Assessing  poor-area  targeting performance
Each provincial government's optimal allocation to a household is unobserved, but it
depends on the household's level of poverty. That may in turn depend on where the
household lives, but I assume that the poverty rate in the area where it lives does not matter to
a household's allocation independently of its own level of welfare. In other words, there is
no "poor-area bias" in that a poor person living in a poor local-government  area expects to
get the same amount from the program as an equally poor person living in a rich area of the
same province.  (The allocations need not be identical, but only equal in expectation; random
16deviations are allowed.) The same holds for the non-poor. This assumption can be thought of
as a form of horizontal equity within provinces (Ravallion, 2000).
Let us consider how to measure each province's performance,  making this assumption
of horizontal equity in expectation within the province. The central government allocates a
total budget of G per capita across Mprovinces such that Gj per capita is received by
provincej.  After that, each province decides how much should go to the poor versus the non-
poor. The chosen allocation by provincej is G,' per capita for the non-poor and  for the
poor. Provincej comprises  Mj local government areas, which I call "departments". The per
capita allocations to department i (=1,.., Mj) within provincej can be written as:
Gn = G; +  e,,  and GP = G, +  (9)
where the £s  are departmental  deviations from province means.
Total disbursements  to the poor and non-poor must exhaust the budget. This creates
an accounting identity linking total program expenditure  per capita to the poverty rate in a
department. Let GY  denote program spending in the i'th department of thej'th  province, and
let the corresponding poverty rate be H, - the "headcount index", given by the proportion of
the population that is poor (for which the overall poverty rate in the province is Hi).  Then:
GUJ  = HUG#P  + (1-HHj)G,  (10)
Using equation (9) we can re-write (10) in the form of a simple linear regression across all
departments in provincej:
Gjj - Gj = Tj(Hjj - Hj) + v,j.  (11)
where
v.  =  g6,' + (e,'P -g,l)H,j  (12)
17and Tj = GJP  - GJ. is the absolute difference  between the average allocation to the poor and
that to the non-poor in provincej. If Tj is negative  then the program favors the non-poor in
absolute terms; if Tj is positive, then the program favors the poor, and the higher the targeting
differential, the more provincial spending favors the poor.
How can the targeting differential be estimated? Under the horizontal equity
assumption, the error tern in (12) has zero mean for any given province and is uncorrelated
with H, since the es  are zero-mean errors within any given province and are uncorrelated
with Hy  (and its squared value). Thus H, is exogenous in (11) and so one can estimate TJ
from an OLS regression of G, on Hi across all departments  within a given province.1 2
Provincial performance in reaching poor areas can thus be measured by the regression
coefficient of spending per capita on the poverty rate, estimated across all departments in
each province. Call this the "targeting differential" (TD) for provincej. This is given by:
Mj.
. (Gei  - G,)(Hi  - Hj)
i=1  (13)
Y. (Hu  - Hj)2
One can similarly define a national inter-departmental  targeting differential, by calculating
(13) over all departments nationally (ignoring province boundaries).
The targeting differential can be interpreted as a measure of absolute progressivity,
namely the difference between per capita spending on the poor and that on the non-poor. A
TD of zero indicates that there is no difference in Trabajar spending on the poor versus non-
poor. A positive TD means that the program favors poor areas; a negative coefficient means
it favors non-poor areas. Poverty is measured by the proportion of the population deemed to
have unmet basic needs (IJBN), based on the 1991 census.
1Z  Equation  (12) indicates  that the error term  will not be homoskedastic.  Standard  errors  of the
targeting  differential  were corrected  for heteroscedasticity.
18The overall targeting differentials across all 510 departments were $41, $110 and $76
per capita for TI, TII and Tll  respectively; all three are significant at the 1% level. To help
interpret these numbers, compare the poorest department,  namely Figueroa (in Santiago Del
Estero province) where the incidence of unmet basic needs is 75.5%, with the least poor
department, namely Chacabuco (in Chaco province) where the poverty measure is 3.3%. The
expected difference in spending was $30 under TI, $79 under TII, and $55 under TIII.
So the expansion to the programn  between TI and TII was associated with a more pro-
poor allocation of funds geographically, while the contraction between TII and TIII came
with a less pro-poor allocation. Next we will see if this aggregate correlation is borne out
when we compare provinces over times.
5.  Program spending and poor-area  targeting across provinces
With the extra degrees of freedom made possible by exploiting the changes in the
inter-provincial  allocation of spending, it is possible to test for statistically significant effects
of fiscal expansion and contraction on the program's targeting perfonnance.  The better
information system for TII and Tlll allows a breakdown of the aggregates into sub-periods by
province. Intervals of five months were chosen. A data addendum is available from the
author giving the detailed breakdown of the aggregate  targeting differentials by these
intervals, as well as program spending per capita for each five-month period. 13
To assess the effect of the cuts on targeting performance, one can regress the province
and period-specific targeting differentials  on program spending per capita across provinces,
pooling all five-month periods and all provinces. The targeting differential will, however,
vary across provinces according to other factors, such as the strength of provincial concern
for the poor, how poor the province is as a whole, the history of the provincial efforts at
13  This is an extended  version  of the data  used in Ravallion  (1999).  The latter  paper  only used
data  for TIH.  Adding  TII more  than doubles  the  number  of degrees  of freedom  in the data.
19targeting the poor, and the capabilities of local managers. It is not implausible that some or all
of these variables will also be correlated with program spending. So their omission will yield
a biased estimate of the effect of cuts on targeting performance. However, this problem can
be dealt with by treating these differences in provincial targeting performance as provincial
fixed effects when estimating the impact of changes in program spending.
Given these considerations, the test for the effect of changes in program
disbursements on targeting performance takes the form of a regression of the province and
date-specific targeting differential on aggregate spending per capita in the province and a set
of province-specific effects. The regression is thus:
Tj, =  a + 3Gj,  + NJ  +  p1j,  (=1,..,22; t1,2,3,..)  (14)
where T  is the targeting differential for provincej at date t, Gjt is spehding by provincej at
date t,  qj is the province-specific effect and p 1 jt is an innovation error, representing random,
idiosyncratic, differences in targeting performance uncorrelated with spending. As discussed
above, the aggregate spending allocation Gj, is, however, allowed to be endogenous in that it
is correlated with the province effect ij.
This regression can be used to estimate a counter-factual  targeting differential, which
controls for differences over time in program spending. In particular, define the budget-
neutral targeting differential (TD ) as the value of TD if program spending did not vary over
time within provinces, and was given by the mean spending of TII and TIll.  This is
identified by simply re-writing equation (10) as:
Tjt =  (Gjt-Gj)+T*  +± 1jt  (15)
Thus Tj is the expected value of the targeting differential for provincej  when program
spending does not vary over time in that province. By regressing Tjt  on spending expressed
as a deviation from the overall (five month) mean spending per capita for TII and TIII, and a
20complete set of province dummy variables, one can then estimate Tj*  by the regression
coefficient on thej'th  dummy variable. For example, the coefficient on the province dummy
variable for Cordoba in TII can be interpreted as the estimated targeting differential for that
province under Trabajar II if it had its mean budget allocation across TII and TIll.
Table 4 gives the results, both for the combined sample and split between TII and
TIII.  When the regressions for TII and Tlll are combined, allowing all coefficients to differ
between TII and TIII, a joint test convincingly  rejects the null hypothesis that the budget-
neutral TDs are the same for the two programs. I also tested whether the estimated value of j
was different when spending increased versus decreased;  there was no significant difference
(the coefficient on the interaction effect between Gj, - Gj and I(Gjt - Gj),  where Iis the
indicator function, had a t-ratio of-0.38).  There is no difference in the absolute value of the
effects of spending cuts versus increases.
The regression coefficient of the targeting differential on program spending is 3.13 for
the combined samples. So a $10 cut in spending reduced the targeting differential by $3.13
on average. For TII, the regression coefficient of the targeting differential on program
spending is 3.55. For TIll, the estimated regression coefficient rises to 10.22. So not only has
targeting performance deteriorated in the change from TII to TIII, but the effect of changes in
program spending on targeting performance has increased under TIll.
The budget neutral TD for TII is positive in 18 of the 22 provinces, and significantly
so (at the 5% level or better) in 14 of those; there is one province (Buenos Aires) in which the
budget neutral TD is significantly negative. Under TIll, the province effects are now positive
in all except one province, and are statistically significant  in 18 provinces.
There is a high correlation between the budget-neutral TD's (r=0.88). However, it is
notable that the budget-neutral TD's are generally higher for TIII.  The weaker targeting
performance of TIII largely vanishes if one controls for the difference in budget allocation.
21Indeed, the targeting performance of TIII would generally be better than that of TII if both
had the same disbursement rate over time for each province.
This comparison of the budget-neutral TDs suggests that other factors were operating
to mitigate the effects of lower spending on poor-area targeting performance. The main
design change that might have helped is that project size was restricted under TIII; TII
allowed projects with up to 100 workers; this was cut to 40 under TIII, and this constraint
appears to have been binding. The larger projects are thought to have been more common in
less poor cities and towns. Another factor identified in discussions  with the central project
management is that greater efforts were made (starting during TII, but probably with lagged
effects) to train municipalities and NGOs in how to prepare viable project proposals.
Discussions with the central program administrators  also indicated that targeting performance
might have improved with tighter administration and supervision of the program under TIII,
and a clearer understanding by all parties involved of the programs' aims.
The design changes clearly helped mitigate the effect of higher participation of
Buenos Aires under TIll.  On balance, Table 4 suggests that overall poor-area targeting
would have improved slightly between TII and TIII if not for the cut in spending.
The model in section 2 offers some clues as to why we observe a deterioration in
targeting performance with cuts, and an improvement  with program expansion. A long-
standing concern about any program such as Trabajar is that poor municipalities have a
harder time raising the cofinancing required for the sub-projects. A provincial government
that wants to influence which municipalities participate can readily do so through its ability to
propose and confinance projects. In some provinces, it is clear that the provincial
government is active in proposing projects in the capital city so as to placate vocal well-
organized groups. The workers involved may well be just as poor as those in poorer
22municipalities outside the capital city. However, to assure maximum impact on poverty it is
still preferable for the assets created by the program to be in poor areas.
The political economy of the program's operation in most provinces entailed that the
cuts were borne heavily by poor areas. The cofmancing requirements allow considerable
provincial discretion in the geographic allocation of program spending. Discussions with a
number of the provincial project managers and staff have suggested that it was politically
difficult in some provinces to assure that the cuts came only from non-poor areas. This
reflected (in part) the fact that the program was already favoring poor areas, and so there was
little slack for cutting heavily elsewhere while still leaving sufficiently broad participation.
Given these pervasive local political-economy constraints, we can begin to understand
why lower disbursements  resulted in worse performance in reaching poor areas. When a
program such as this is cut, there is little obvious saving, via project financing, to non-poor
areas. The program has negligible cost-recovery  from non-poor areas, even for sub-projects
in those areas. Low cost-recovery (at the margin) of program benefits in non-poor areas
leaves the poor more exposed to cuts. Also it is not implausible that marginal benefits to the
non-poor were quite high; the initially high degree of targeting implied low allocations to
non-poor areas and so probably high marginal benefits. The fact that the program provided
work to poor neighbors in non-poor areas presumably also entailed indirect benefits to the
non-poor. Under these conditions, sub-projects  in non-poor areas would have to be protected
from cuts to avoid a welfare loss to the non-poor.
One can argue that all this helped assure this program's success in helping the poor in
the crisis.  While the program was clearly well targeted (to both poor workers and poor
communities), it was almost certainly not a political equilibrium to assure that only poor
areas participated. The other side of the coin to good targeting, was that the (relatively
modest) spending on the non-poor had to be protected from cuts.
236.  Conclusions
Even  when  they  have  the power  to do so, it is not obvious  that  it will be in the
interests  of the non-poor  to shift  the burden  of fiscal  adjustment  to the poor. And  even  a
minority  poor  can have  political  influence.  As  this paper  has demonstrated,  the incidence  of
fiscal  contraction,  and hence  the case  for action  to protect  public  spending  on the poor  at a
time of overall  fiscal  austerity,  is an empirical  question. This  paper  has tried to address  that
question  using  various  data  sets  for Argentina.
Aggregate  budget  cuts in the 1980s  and '90s typically  resulted  in proportionately
greater  cuts in social  spending;  it was "non-social"  spending  that  was protected.  However,  the
proportionate  cuts  were about  the same  for types  of social  spending  that  matter  more  to the
poor as for those  that  tend  to favor  the non-poor.  The absolute  cuts were  in fact greater  for
"social  insurance"  that matters  more  to the non-poor.
However,  spending  on targeted  social  assistance  and  employment  programs  was more
vulnerable  to aggregate  spending  cuts  than  more  universal  social  services. While  social
spending  as a whole  was clearly  exposed  to fiscal  contraction,  this was somewhat  less  true of
pro-poor  spending  on things  that  benefited  the non-poor  too. Fine targeting  may  thus  be a
mixed  blessing  for the poor;  a higher  mean  may  come  with greater  vulnerability  to cuts  -
and quite  possibly  the cuts will come  at times  when  help  is most needed. There is a strong
case  for action  to protect  pro-poor  social  spending  at such  times.
The  paper  studied  one  program  that attempted  to do so. The program  was introduced
(with  support  from  the World  Bank)  to help  compensate  poor unemployed  workers  and  their
families  for the effects  of a macroeconomic  shock.  The design  features  of the program  -
providing  low wage  work  targeted  to poor  areas  - helped  assure  that  the program  was far
better  at reaching  the poor  than  the pre-existing  components  of social  spending  in Argentina.
24However, the program was clearly subject to the same constraints in the political
economy that influenced the incidence of past fiscal contractions  in Argentina. The program
expanded into poor areas when the budget increased, but it retreated from poor areas when
the program was cut. It was the program's disbursements  to non-poor areas that were
protected. Given the low wage rate offered, the direct benefits from the work are still very
likely to have favored the poor, even after the cuts. So the design features of the program
undoubtedly helped protect the poor from cuts.
In conclusion, the time series data for Argentina suggest that action to support pro-
poor sending at times of aggregate fiscal contraction is warranted. Social spending in
general, and targeted social spending in particular, took a heavy hit at times of fiscal
austerity. The add-on program studied here was able to achieve far more pro-poor targeting
than pre-existing social spending. The new program was clearly not immune to the same
underlying forces in the political economy that help protect spending on the non-poor from
aggregate fiscal contractions. But the program helped the families of poor unemployed
workers at a time of need; given the pattern of past public spending, it appears unlikely they
would have received such help otherwise.
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15Table 1: Incidence of social spending and taxes in Argentina 1996
Shares of spending attributed to quintiles of households ranked by income per person:
1  2  3  4  5  Total
(poorest)
Social Services  29.8  18.8  21.7  16.8  13.0  100
Social Insurance  9.9  20.6  19.5  23.6  26.5  100
Total Social Spending  21.8  19.5  20.8  19.5  18.4  100
Taxes  7.1  10.7  14.9  20.1  47.2  100
Income shares  4.0  8.4  13.2  21.2  53.2  100
Source: World Bank (1999), quoting Gasparini (1999); estimates for urban Argentina in 1996.
29Table 2: Elasticities of social spending to total public spending in Argentina
Spending  Sub-categories  Share of  Elasticity to a change in total  2SLS
category  total  public spending  estimate of
spending  in  the elasticity (%/0)  totIncrease  n  Decrease m  for a decrease
total spending  total spending  in spending
Social insurance  32.38  0.070  2.050*  2.240*
(0.396)  (0.368)  (0.340)
Social care  21.24  -0.129  2.243*  2.449*
(incl. pensions)  (0.533)  (0.569)  (0.509)
Health  8.36  0.321  1.698  1.773
(0.561)  (0.376)  (0.438)
Work (incl. unemploy.  1.88  0.704  2.904*  3.637
comp.)  (2.068)  (0.937)  (1.691)
Social services  23.30  0.246  2.255*  2.343*
(0.543)  (0.332)  (0.389)
Social services (excl. housing and  21.43  0.386  2.327*  2.589*
urban)  (0.481)  (0.320)  (0.367)
Sector classification of social services
Education  11.47  0.270  2.283*  2.328*
(0.591)  (0.398)  (0.435)
Health  4.83  0.740  2.098*  2.678*
(0.578)  (0.333)  (0.443)
Housing and urban  1.87  0.444  0.551
(0.524)  (1.158)
Social assistance (incl.  1.76  0.377  2.992*  3.650*
family allowances)  (0.912)  (0.611)  (0.797)
Employment prograns  0.15  1.698  2.740*  4.515*
(1.239)  (0.591)  (1.355)
Targeted/universal  classification of social services
Targeted  4.09  -0.488  2.200*  1.587
(0.876)  (0.554)  (0.726)
Targeted (excl.  2.22  0.220  3.009*  3.422*
housing and urban)  (0.834)  (0.568)  (0.695)
Universal  19.21  0.398  2.267*  2.505
(0.542)  (0.343)  (0.402)
Total  55.68  0.138  2.140*  2.277*
(0.368)  (0.260)  (0.272)
Note: Regressions of the change in the log of each spending category on the change in the log of total
public spending, with intercepts, estimated on annual data for 1980-97. 2SLS estimator uses lagged
total spending and lagged social spending as the instruments; the dummy variable for whether total
spending has decreased is used as its own instrument. (The F-test for the first stage regression was
4.43, significant at the 3% level.) White standard errors in parentheses; * indicates significantly
different from one at the 5% level.
30Table 3: Selected points on the concentration  curves
Poorest x% of  Proportion  of households  Cumrulative  share of  Cumulative  share of
households  ranked  with Trabajar  II participants  benefits  from social  benefits  from social
by income per  with an income  per person  services  insurance
person;  that places  them amongst
x=  the poorest  x% nationally
20  76  30  10
40  92  49  31
60  97  70  50
80  99  87  74
Note:  For  comparability  with Table I the figures  for Trabajar  participants  are households  not people
(Figure  2 is people  not households).
Sources:  As for Table 1, except  for Trabajar  participation  which is from Jalan  and Ravallion  (1999).
31Table 4: Budget effects on poor-area  targeting of Argentina's Trabajar Programs
Full sample  Trabajar  II  Trabajar  III
Variable  coefficient  t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio  coefficient  t-ratio
Program spending  3.13  4.81  3.55  5.32  10.39  4.44
(deviation  from time
mean  TII+TIII)
Budget-neutral  Targeting  Differentials
Buenos  Aires  -5.62  -2.50  -8.35  -2.38  -3.78  -0.43
Catamarca  49.48  3.34  20.38  2.12  93.31  9.54
Chaco  10.07  2.13  6.73  0.60  31.11  3.02
Chubut  31.53  3.92  29.89  2.89  39.99  4.46
Cordoba  144.60  10.25  131.35  6.94  161.51  18.35
Corrientes  24.68  4.64  19.16  2.51  41.25  4.38
Entre Rios  15.27  3.12  16.29  1.96  22.68  2.50
Formosa  10.38  1.82  6.54  0.51  26.74  2.81
Jujuy  61.23  4.59  46.80  8.58  92.46  9.28
La Pampa  6.37  1.36  11.15  1.16  8.01  0.89
La Rioja  3.97  0.43  -1.82  -0.09  26.64  2.62
Mendoza  29.98  4.17  34.67  2.50  31.64  3.54
Misiones  -2.10  -0.29  -15.69  -1.68  23.62  2.47
Neuquen  -8.07  -1.55  -6.32  -0.66  6.79  0.68
Rio Negro  52.33  4.28  59.11  2.60  54.82  5.97
Salta  67.30  10.81  64.22  6.20  86.70  8.63
San Juan  50.50  6.73  63.15  8.69  48.72  5.23
San Luis  37.08  6.11  30.34  3.55  61.68  5.94
Santa Cruz  9.33  1.21  4.62  0.30  26.50  2.81
Santa  Fe  18.52  2.95  30.05  4.23  16.54  1.79
Santiago  Del Estero  22.53  3.97  20.09  2.06  43.67  4.12
Tucuman  46.22  5.23  60.32  4.63  46.90  4.76
no. observations  132  66  66
R-squared  0.778  0.813  0.903
S.E. of regression  0.265  0.209  0.176
Mean dep. variable  0.307  0.328  0.276
F-statistic  17.38  8.493  8.568
Note:  The  dependent  variable  is the targeting  differential  given  by the regression  coefficient  of
Trabajar  spending  per capita  at department  level  for each  province  and time period  on the incidence  of
unmet  basic  needs  per capita. The observation  period  for each  of lTI and TIII  was divided  into  three
five  month-intervals  (one six month  interval  for  TIll, converted  into  a five  month  equivalent);  a
statistical  addendum  with details  is available  from  the author.  The  t-ratios  are  based on White
standard  errors.
32Addendum
Derivation of equations 5.1 and 5.2
The necessary conditions for a maximum of U'[Y'  - (G" + GP), G',GP]  with respect
to Gn and GPare that
U 1y[Yn-  (Gn + GP)]  = Un(Gn)  = Up (GP)
(recalling that utility is assumed to be separable). The implicit solutions give Gn and GPas
functions of Yn.  On differentiating  w.r.t. Y'  we have:
U;Y ayn +  Unn  ay  =Un  U~(Al)
UnaG  +Upn aGP= Un  (A2)
where G =  + GP. Equations (Al) and (A2) imply that:
Un  (aGn  /aG  )Un  (aGP  /aG)=O  (A3)
n  dy,,  a7yn  pp ayn ayn
Also:
lgGn wG  aGP  aG
(-I"/@  )+(G  I-G)=1  (A4) ayn  ayn  ayn  ayn)
(since G  G" + GP). Solving (A3) and (A4) and noting that
- =G,/IYn  (A5.1)
aGa  /  yn
rP  aGpl/  ayn  (A5.2)
we get equations (5.1) and (5.2).
33Supplementary data tables
Table Al: Targeting Performance  by Five Month Intervals, Trabajar II and.Ill
Targeting  differential
($ per person  per five months)
Province  Trabajar  II  Trabajar IH
11.1  11.2  11.3  111.1  111.2  11I.3
5/1997-  10/1997-  3/1998-  8/1998-  1/1999-  7/1999-
9/1997  2/1998  7/1998  12/1998  6/1999  11/1999
(5 month
equivalent)
Buenos  Aires  -2.8  -15.4*  -7.8  1.6  -3.8  -5.5
Catamarca  33.9  11.6  30.7  51.4*  85.1*  84.2*
Chaco  19.3  2.7  18.2  11.3  0.3  8.6
Chubut  33.1  45.4  18.2  55.8*  34.2*  2.5
Cordoba  143.5*  96.9*  159.3*  187.2*  113.3*  167.4*
Corrientes  67.6*  -0.3  4.8  20.4*  21.2*  34.4*
Entre Rios  31.2  -0.6  26.0  22.8  -4.3  16.5
Formosa  7.9  18.5*  6.7  6.1  9.4  13.7
Jujuy  93.2*  27.1  34.2  128.6*  46.9*  37.4
LaPampa  27.8*  17.5*  -6.0  3.3  -4.5  0.1
La Rioja  -7.5  -1.3  22.4  -1.1  11.2  0.1
Mendoza  64.0*  4.4  43.5*  35.3*  13.5  19.2*
Misiones  -14.2  -8.8  -8.5  0.6  8.8  9.5
Neuquen  -4.3  -11.4  12.6  -23.8  -13.6  -7.9
RioNegro  60.1*  25.1  103.2*  28.1*  69.9*  27.6*
Salta  94.4*  39.5*  76.6*  49.6*  81.4*  62.3*
San Juan  92.0*  63.1*  45.7*  35.5*  49.7*  17.0
San Luis  78.5  3.1  31.2*  29.6*  29.3*  50.8*
Santa Cruz  39.3  -23.3  8.3  3.6  24.0  4.1
Santa Fe  56.7*  25.7*  19.9*  8.1  -3.1  3.8
Santiago  Del Estero  88.3*  -6.6  3.8  9.2  18.4*  22.1
Tucuman  112.2*  38.6*  47.1*  27.8*  26.3*  25.3
All departnents  71.6*  15.3*  22.9*  24.3*  23.4*  23.9*
Note: * indicates  significantly  different  from zero  at the 5% level.
34Table A2:  Program Spending by Five Month Intervals, Trabajar II and III
Program  disbursements
($ per person per five months)
Province  Trabajar  HI  Trabajar  III
11.1  11.2  11.3  111.1  III.2  I11.3
5/1997-  10/1997-  3/1998-  8/1998-  1/1999-  7/1999-
9/1997  2/1998  7/1998  12/1998  6/1999  11/1999
(5 month
equivalent)
Buenos Aires  1.09  0.92  1.51  1.23  1.57  1.42
Catamarca  14.24  3.76  4.06  3.42  3.96  3.28
Chaco  17.79  5.16  7.09  6.88  4.02  5.06
Chubut  5.67  2.69  4.83  3.32  2.18  2.40
Cordoba  4.44  2.82  2.38  2.12  1.77  2.55
Corrientes  14.81  2.30  3.38  4.74  2.73  3.83
Entre Rios  7.43  4.13  3.92  4.38  2.46  2.28
Fortnosa  13.36  4.19  5.22  4.86  4.23  3.86
Jujuy  18.96  5.20  6.58  9.41  4.46  4.46
La Pampa  8.54  4.20  6.20  5.60  4.30  4.20
La Rioja  15.13  2.55  4.00  3.06  2.61  2.59
Mendoza  5.89  1.56  2.23  1.72  1.10  1.68
Misiones  12.05  6.07  5.56  4.93  3.83  4.92
Neuquen  12.11  5.83  7.68  6.07  3.54  3.37
Rio Negro  8.90  4.58  5.51  4.13  3.85  3.53
Salta  13.07  3.78  4.55  2.52  3.51  2.51
San Juan  8.92  3.35  2.79  1.86  2.91  1.83
San Luis  16.66  2.47  3.53  2.78  2.30  3.08
Santa Cruz  5.69  2.87  4.05  0.42  2.62  0.37
Santa  Fe  7.95  4.46  4.01  3.06  2.36  3.14
Santiago Del Estero  21.38  4.07  3.96  3.87  4.18  5.71
Tucuman  13.65  4.58  5.46  4.12  4.00  3.77
All departments  6.37  2.58  3.05  2.62  2.29  2.44
35Table A3: Data used for Table 2
Total  Social  Social insurance  Social services
public  spending  Total  Pensions  Health  Unemp-  Total  Educa-  Health  Housing  Social  Employ-  Targeted  Universal
spending  etc  loyment  tion  etc  assist.  ment
1980  77.792  38.861  22.055  13.873  5.4040  2.065  16.807  8.004  3.11  2.095  1.258  0.069  3.422  13.385
1981  82.007  38.959  23.263  13.894  7.075  1.327  15.696  7.644  3.314  1.179  1.342  0.055  2.575  13.121
1982  66.459  25.796  15.243  8.641  5.105  0.800  10.553  5.154  2.207  1.085  0.749  0.036  1.87  8.683
1983  66.148  29.143  16.133  8.823  5.447  1.141  13.009  6.299  2.527  1.712  0.908  0.037  2.656  10.353
1984  68.337  33.334  17.793  10.399  5.686  0.991  15.541  7.909  3.099  1.524  1.289  0.047  2.86  12.681
1985  69.567  34.709  19.711  12.805  5.220  1.021  14.998  7.262  2.890  1.365  1.595  0.052  3.012  11.986
1986  74.143  39.755  22.126  14.003  5.798  1.590  17.628  8.577  3.509  1.715  1.662  0.047  3.424  14.204
1987  82.044  44.236  24.665  16.233  6.267  1.404  19.571  9.641  3.692  1.972  1.885  0.052  3.909  15.662
1988  72.657  37.663  20.913  13.459  5.977  0.778  16.750  8.483  3.202  1.442  1.570  0.045  3.058  13.692
1989  65.252  34.174  20.486  14.574  4.658  0.739  13.689  6.557  2.730  1.045  1.725  0.030  2.800  10.889
1990  61.948  37.878  23.231  16.179  5.687  0.765  14.647  7.171  2.896  1.444  1.197  0.039  2.679  11.968
1991  68.807  43.471  26.776  18.588  6.140  1.466  16.695  8.009  3.497  1.367  1.416  0.058  2.841  13.854
1992  77.301  48.613  29.415  20.725  6.652  1.455  19.198  9.347  4.297  1.120  1.696  0.090  2.905  16.293
1993  82.670  52.511  30.567  20.584  7.267  2.009  21.945  10.792  4.850  1.126  2.026  0.194  3.260  18.685
1994  88.203  57.765  34.047  22.816  8.225  2.226  23.717  11.605  5.380  1.270  2.225  0.279  3.657  20.06
1995  85.393  55.530  33.213  22.083  8.109  2.269  22.318  11.325  5.009  1.121  1.819  0.266  3.216  19.102
1996  83.246  54.532  32.190  21.854  7.705  2.100  22.342  11.260  5.037  1.139  1.926  0.359  3.480  18.862
1997  87.393  56.542  32.116  21.972  7.662  2.005  24.426  12.435  5.263  1.319  2.371  0.471  4.010  20.416
Note: Billion pesos in 1997  prices. Source: Government of Argentina (1999).Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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